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This paper proposes a new theory to account for the effects of underload on performance.  
Malleable attentional resources theory posits that attentional capacity can change size in 
response to changes in task demands.  As such, the performance decrements associated 
with mental underload can be explained by a lack of appropriate attentional resources.  
These proposals were explored in a driving simulator experiment.  Vehicle automation 
was manipulated at four levels, and mental workload was assessed with a secondary task.  
Eye movements were also recorded to determine whether attentional capacity varied with 
mental workload.  The results showed a clear decrease in mental workload associated 
with some levels of automation.  Most striking, though, were the results derived from the 
eye movement recordings, which demonstrated that attentional capacity varies directly 
with level of mental workload.  These data fully supported the predictions of the new 
malleable attentional resources theory.  The implications of this theory are discussed with 
regard to capacity models of attention, as well as to the design of future vehicle systems. 
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AUTOMOTIVE AUTOMATION 
With the new millennium upon us, major motor manufacturers are offering new 
vehicle automation devices.  Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) has already been released, 
offering total longitudinal control of the vehicle.  Soon, we will see lateral control devices 
such as Active Steering (AS) taking to the roads.  Although automation is usually 
implemented with the intention of reducing workload and thereby improving 
performance, current evidence suggests that excessively low mental demands are actually 
detrimental to performance.  Rather than being a consequence of out-of-the-loop 
behaviour (Ephrath and Young, 1981; Kessel and Wickens, 1982), some believe that 
mental underload is in itself responsible for performance decrements (e.g., Brookhuis, 
1993; Hancock and Caird, 1993).  Indeed, underload is possibly of greater concern than 
overload, as it is more difficult to detect (Hancock and Parasuraman, 1992; Hancock and 
Verwey, 1997). 
Although there is widespread concern about mental underload, relatively few 
researchers seem to be actively involved in exploring the issue in the context of vehicle 
automation.  There are, however, a handful of experiments which have found degraded 
performance when using vehicle automation, mostly in recovery from automation failure.  
The explanations for such results vary around expectations about the automation 
(Nilsson, 1995), mobilisation of effort (Desmond, Hancock and Monette, 1998), 
complacency (de Waard, van der Hulst, Hoedemaeker and Brookhuis, 1999), and mental 
workload (Stanton, Young and McCaulder, 1997). 
 Despite these few studies, the literature has so far failed to produce a coherent and 
parsimonious explanation for why mental underload should be detrimental to 
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performance.  This paper uses the currently pertinent subject of vehicle automation as an 
applied focus for a significant theoretical proposition. 
 
Malleable Attentional Resources Theory (MART) 
The breadth of the underload problem in the literature suggests it is not limited to 
situations involving automation.  An example is recent research at the University of 
Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute.  Participants were sometimes slower to 
complete in-car tasks when stationary, than when trying to perform them while driving 
(O. Tsimhoni, personal communication, September 14 1999).  It seemed that participants 
were not as efficient without the additional driving workload even though they were 
trying to complete the task as quickly as they could.  Thus there appears to be an 
underlying cognitive problem associated with underload, which has not yet been 
satisfactorily identified.  So, in an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, the current 
paper offers a new theory based on attentional resource theory. 
Attentional resource theories make a common basic assumption about 
performance: if demands exceed resource capacity, performance degrades.  In the 
original capacity model of attention, Kahneman (1973) suggested that attentional 
capacity was positively associated with physiological arousal.  Further work since has 
found that resource size may change with long-term fluctuations in mood or age (Hasher 
and Zacks, 1979; Humphreys and Revelle, 1984).  However, most applied research on 
attention has implicitly assumed that the size of resource pools is fixed (cf. Wickens, 
1984; 1992).  It is posited here, though, that this limit may change in the relatively short 
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term, depending on task circumstances.  This introduces the concept of malleable 
attentional resource pools. 
Evidence is accumulating that simply reducing demand is not necessarily a key to 
improving performance.  It has been proposed (e.g., Young and Stanton, 1997a; 1997b; 
1999a; 1999b; 2000) that resources may actually shrink to accommodate any demand 
reduction, in a converse of the ‘work expands to fill the time available’ tenet.  This could 
explain the apparent degradation of attention and performance observed in low demand 
tasks.  If the maximum capacity of an operator has been limited as a consequence of the 
task, it is not surprising that they cannot cope when a critical situation arises.  Malleable 
attentional resources theory (MART) therefore potentially explains why mental 
underload can lead to performance degradation. 
Imagine someone driving a car with ACC and AS engaged.  This is a situation 
which considerably reduces MWL (Young and Stanton, 1997a).  Assuming an attentional 
demand model of MWL (cf. Liao and Moray, 1993; Young and Stanton, 2001), this 
translates to low demand on resources.  Now, MART posits that the size of the relevant 
resource pool will temporarily diminish, as it is not required.  This could result in poorer 
performance on any subsidiary tasks, or problems if the driver is suddenly faced with 
increased demand (e.g., if the automation fails). 
The idea that the level of task demands can influence cognitive processing has 
been hinted at in previous research.  Buck, Payne and Barany (1994) quoted the ‘par 
hypothesis’ to explain some of their results.  This states that, as demands fluctuate, 
operators increase or decrease the amount of effort invested in a task to maintain 
performance at a set level.  This level represents an operator’s personal par for that task.  
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There is some support for this notion.  Liao and Moray (1993) found that participants 
invest more effort with higher time pressure, which may increase attentional capacity.  
Conversely, Desmond and Hoyes (1996) concluded that a decrease in performance at low 
levels of demand might be due to a failure to mobilise effort appropriately to match the 
task.  More recently, Wickens, Xu, Helleberg and Marsh (2001) suggested effort 
conservation as the explanation as to why pilots in a simulated aviation task actually 
devoted more visual attention to an instrument panel when the task was easier.  Finally, 
the concept of fluctuating resource pools has also been aired by Karashima and Saito 
(2001), in their proposed Flucutation of Working Memory (FLOWM) hypothesis.  Whilst 
these authors present a very detailed explanation of how capacity fluctuates, they fail to 
offer any reasoning as to why (see also Young and Stanton, 2002, for a discussion of 
working memory versus attentional resource models). 
The malleable resources hypothesis reflects these attitudes, but is a little more 
parsimonious with respect to current knowledge.  Taking inspiration from Kahneman’s 
(1973) original theory, it does not appeal to extraneous concepts such as effort or 
motivation, instead relying purely upon task demands to govern the size of attentional 
resources.  In its ‘strongest’ form, then, MART states that: the size of attentional resource 
pools varies positively with MWL up to a finite limit, such that excessive reductions in 
MWL shrink capacity (which in turn can cause performance decrements), and that this is 
independent of variations in arousal or effort.  A simpler form would merely state that 
attentional capacity and MWL are directly related. 
The present experiment was intended as a first step to determining whether the 
malleable resources hypothesis has enough credence to warrant deeper investigation.  
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Vehicle automation was investigated in a simulated environment, and care was taken to 
control for alternative explanations as much as possible.  By systematically varying the 
level of automation, factors such as boredom, fatigue, and motivation should be 
accounted for.  Similarly, since all conditions imposed similar levels of physical demand, 
it is unlikely that physiological arousal will have an affect on the results. 
 
 
METHOD 
Design 
This experiment was designed to investigate the potential differences in attention 
and workload amongst drivers under different conditions of automation.  It is expected 
that MWL will decrease as more levels of automation are introduced, and that such 
reductions may be associated with decrements in performance.  Previous research (e.g., 
Nilsson, 1995; Stanton et al., 1997; Ward, Fairclough & Humphreys, 1995) has largely 
concentrated on the effects of ACC.  The Southampton Driving Simulator (SDS) was 
used in the present study to extend this paradigm by also considering lateral control (i.e., 
AS). 
A within-subjects design was used.  Level of automation constituted the 
independent variable, with four levels: manual (the participant controls speed, headway, 
and steering), ACC (longitudinal control is automated), AS (lateral control is automated), 
and ACC+AS (both longitudinal and lateral control are automated).  The latter condition 
essentially constitutes a fully automated vehicle.  Order of presentation of these 
conditions was randomised to counterbalance practice effects. 
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A number of dependent measures were recorded to assess performance, MWL, 
and attention.  The SDS software records a wealth of primary task data, but for the 
purposes of the present experiment the variables considered to be most relevant to driving 
performance were speed, lateral position, and distance headway.  Various derivatives of 
these measures have been successfully used in previous studies of driving performance 
(e.g., Bloomfield and Carroll, 1996; Fairclough, 1997; Verwey and Veltman, 1996; 
Wierwille and Gutmann, 1978).  Furthermore, given the nature of the automated systems 
under examination here, measures of longitudinal and lateral control are most 
appropriate. 
MWL was measured using a self-paced secondary task.  This consisted of a 
rotated figures task (as used by Baber, 1991, and proved by Stanton et al., 1997, in the 
SDS), presented in the lower left corner of the screen.  Each stimulus was a pair of stick 
figures (one upright; the other rotated through 0°, 90°, 180° or 270°) holding one or two 
flags.  The flags were simple geometrical shapes, either squares or diamonds.  The task 
was to make a judgement as to whether the figures were the same or different, based on 
the flags they were holding.  Responses were made via buttons attached to the steering 
column stalks, and brief visual feedback was provided before presentation of the next 
stimulus.  The subsidiary task technique was used in an attempt to measure spare 
attentional capacity.  Participants were thus instructed to attend to the secondary task only 
when they had time to do so.  The secondary task was visual-spatial, requiring a manual 
response, and, as such, was intended to occupy the same attentional resource pools as 
driving.  This ensured that the task was indeed a measure of spare mental capacity (based 
on multiple resources theory), and not some alternative cognitive resource. 
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 Attentional gaze was measured by means of an on-board miniature camera 
directed at the participant’s face.  Total time spent looking at the secondary task was 
coded by video analysis.  The experimenter timed how long the participants’ eyes were 
directed at the bottom left of the screen.  These data were used to investigate the 
malleable resources hypothesis.  This assumes that visual gaze reflects allocation of 
attention, as stated by Underwood and Everatt (1996).  Static resource pools would 
predict that the proportion of time spent looking at the secondary task should correlate 
directly and positively with the number of correct responses.  Any other form of 
association would imply that the size of attentional resource pools can change. 
 The design of this experiment serves--to a certain extent--to rule out competing 
explanations for the results.  By monitoring performance on both primary and secondary 
tasks, it will be possible to determine whether boredom or motivation have influenced the 
results.  If so, there should be a general decline in performance across both tasks.  
Malleable attentional resources theory, however, would predict a specific shrinkage in 
capacity (as inferred from the secondary task) while primary task performance is 
maintained at a constant level.  The counterbalanced presentation of conditions also helps 
reduce the influence of fatigue.  Finally, given the low levels of physical interaction with 
the simulator in all conditions, it was assumed that physiological arousal would be 
roughly constant throughout. 
 
The Southampton Driving Simulator (SDS) 
The SDS is a medium-fidelity, fixed-base driving simulator.  The simulator 
consists of the front half of a Ford Orion.  An Acorn Archimedes computer runs the 
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simulation and generates the display image.  A medium-resolution colour monitor 
displays a view of the road and a simulated instrument panel on a forward projection 
screen, providing a visual area of approximately 40º horizontal by 20º vertical.   
The SDS software records data at a rate of 2Hz.  The following data are logged: 
speed, lateral position on the road, distance from the vehicle in front, distance from 
oncoming vehicle, steering wheel and pedal positions, and collisions.  The simulator was 
set up to run with automatic transmission at all times. 
A more detailed description of the SDS, along with the results of a validation 
study, can be found in Stanton, Young, Walker, Turner and Randle (2001). 
 
Participants 
There were 30 participants (17 male) in this experiment, with a mean age of 25.3 
(SD = 6.53).  All participants held a full UK driving licence, for 6.9 years on average (SD 
= 5.92), and their mean annual mileage was 5650 (SD = 3985).   
Participants were recruited via a poster campaign in and around the University of 
Southampton, and an attempt was made to balance age and gender as far as possible.  The 
experiment met the ethical criteria of both the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Southampton and the British Psychological Society. 
 
Procedure 
After entering the SDS, participants were first given a minimum 15 minute 
practice run (this could be extended, if either participant or experimenter felt that it was 
needed), to acclimatise to the conditions of driving a simulated vehicle.  Following this, 
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experimental instructions were given, including advice on how to operate the automated 
devices and how to respond to the secondary task.  To check that the participants had 
understood the nature of the secondary task, three example stimuli were presented prior 
to the experimental trials beginning.  Once participants were sufficiently familiar with the 
operation of the simulator, the experimental trials would begin.  In accordance with the 
design, there were four conditions, each lasting 10 minutes. 
In all of the experimental conditions, participants were faced with a single-
carriageway road which was a mixture of curved and straight sections.  The track was 
quite simple, with no hills or wind gusts to disturb longitudinal or lateral control.  
Participants were instructed to first catch up and then follow a leading vehicle, which was 
travelling at a constant 70 mph (cf. Stanton et al., 1997), for the duration of the trial (10 
minutes).  There were no other vehicles in the participants’ lane (so no overtaking was 
necessary), although oncoming traffic was encountered infrequently, encouraging 
participants to remain in their own lane.  Participants were required to maintain a 
constant distance from the lead vehicle, although the choice of that distance was left to 
the individual.  There were a number of advantages to this approach.  Firstly, it meant 
that participants did not have to disengage the automatic devices (for instance, in order to 
overtake), thus avoiding contamination of conditions.  Secondly, following a car 
motivated participants to drive at a relatively constant speed, thereby controlling 
objective demand across conditions.  Otherwise, participants may have compensated for 
increased workload by reducing speed, which again would contaminate results.  Finally, a 
constant speed implied that participants all drove approximately equal distances, again 
controlling for workload and attention differences which may otherwise have been 
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incurred.  While driving, participants were expected to attend to the secondary task only 
when they felt able to do so (this instruction was emphasised to participants in order to 
minimise secondary task interference). 
At the end of each 10 minute trial, participants were informed of the conditions 
for the following trial.  When all four trials were completed, participants were thanked for 
their time and debriefed about the purpose of the experiment.  The whole procedure 
lasted approximately 75 minutes. 
 
Data reduction 
There are a number of driving measures which may be used as primary task 
performance variables.  These can be divided into measures of longitudinal and lateral 
control. 
Longitudinal control measures involve speed and headway.  However, simple 
measures of location (i.e., mean, median) do not necessarily provide evaluative 
information about how well participants are performing.  Given the instructions to 
participants (maintain constant speed and headway), it would be logical to adopt a 
measure of consistency (or rather, inconsistency) for these variables.  Fortunately, 
Bloomfield and Carroll (1996) described such a measure, in their derivation of instability.  
“A linear equation that is the line of best fit for a series of points on the track of a vehicle 
can be used to describe the position of the vehicle relative to the center of the lane” 
(Bloomfield and Carroll, 1996; p. 336).  A similar line can be calculated for vehicle 
speed.  The sampling rate of the SDS allows such equations to be calculated for the 1200 
data points on each of the speed and headway variables.  The standard error around this 
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line represents the driver’s ability to maintain stability in the measure.  This is a better 
measure of driving performance than standard deviation, as it reflects the drivers’ 
consistency in their own performance, rather than deviation from an absolute measure (J. 
R. Bloomfield, personal communication, December 15 1999). 
For lateral control, it was considered that instability measures would not be an 
appropriate reflection of driving performance on a road which involves both curved and 
straight sections.  Popular measures of lateral control (such as instability, RMS error, or 
time-to-line-crossing) assume that ‘good’ driving performance is characterised by the 
vehicle remaining consistently in the centre of the lane.  These measures would be 
confounded if participants used modern driving techniques to negotiate the curves on the 
road.  Instead, then, simple measures of lane excursions were used to evaluate lateral 
control, with the assumption then being that good driving performance is rewarded with 
fewer lane excursions.  Total number of lane excursions, and time spent out of lane, were 
the dependent variables for lateral control.  All of the driving performance measures were 
filtered for outliers and extreme values, and these data points were removed prior to 
analysis (i.e., any values outside two standard deviations from the mean). 
For an assessment of the malleable resources hypothesis, a more complex analysis 
was required.  Video analysis was performed on a subset of participants (N = 20).  For 
the remaining participants, the video data were not clear enough to make a reliable 
recording (e.g., due to the participant wearing glasses).  The number of correct responses 
on the secondary task was divided by the total duration of glances directed at that task (a 
measure which can vary independently from secondary task responses), and this 
composite score is referred to here as an attention ratio  (see Figure 1).  A null hypothesis 
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of no difference between the automation conditions on this score would be consistent 
with a model of fixed attentional resource pools.  If resources fluctuate with MWL, then 
the pattern of attention ratio scores should reflect the pattern of MWL results. 
 
STcr Where AR = Attention Ratio 
STt  ST = Secondary Task 
  cr = correct responses 
AR = 
 
 
 t = time 
Figure 1. Derivation of Attention Ratio, used to infer attentional resource capacity.  
Number of correct responses on secondary task were divided by total duration of glances 
directed at that task 
 
RESULTS 
Primary task data 
Each of the four evaluative performance variables (number of lane excursions, 
time spent out of lane, speed instability, headway instability) was evaluated via ANOVA 
with ‘condition’ as a within-subjects factor.  Simple contrasts, with the Manual condition 
as the reference category, were used to determine the nature of any significant effects.  
Since we were interested in the effects of automation on individual components of the 
driving task, this was preferred over a 2x2 ANOVA collapsing across lateral or 
longitudinal control.  By using simple contrasts, the Manual condition serves as a 
baseline by which to compare any performance changes due to automation.  Descriptive 
statistics for evaluative performance variables for which a significant result was observed 
are in Table 1 (nonsignificant data are not presented for reasons of clarity). 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics for evaluative performance variables.  Means are shown in regular 
type, standard deviations are shown in italics. 
 
Cells: Mean 
 SD 
 
Manual 
 
ACC 
 
AS 
 
ACC+AS 
Number of lane 
excursions 
42.0 
16.5 
39.7 
14.2 
1.04 
1.00 
1.61 
1.37 
Time spent out 
of lane 
111.1 
48.8 
101.7 
52.1 
2.68 
3.45 
4.69 
4.73 
Speed 
instability 
10.2 
3.38 
9.17 
3.31 
8.92 
1.73 
7.13 
0.741 
 
Turning first to the measures of lateral driving performance, number of lane 
excursions produced a significant main effect of automation (F(3,72) = 163.2, p < 0.001).  
There was no difference between the Manual and ACC conditions (F(1,24) = 0.004, p = 
0.950), however number of lane excursions significantly reduced in the AS (F(1,24) = 
192.2, p < 0.001) and ACC+AS conditions (F(1,24) = 194.9, p < 0.001).  The existence 
of lane excursions in the AS conditions is most likely due to noise in the data which 
escaped the filtering process (e.g., variation in lateral position before the system had been 
engaged). 
Time spent out of lane displayed a similar pattern, with a significant main effect 
of automation (F(3,66) = 69.1, p < 0.001).  Again, the difference between Manual and 
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ACC conditions was nonsignificant (F(1,22) = 1.73, p = 0.202), whilst time spent out of 
lane significantly reduced in both the AS (F(1,22) = 96.0, p < 0.001) and ACC+AS 
conditions (F(1,22) = 88.2, p < 0.001).  As with number of lane excursions, the fact that 
there are some nonzero values in the AS conditions is most likely due to variations in 
performance before the system had been engaged. 
The analysis of speed instability also demonstrated a main effect of automation 
(F(3,63) = 7.07, p < 0.001).  Compared to Manual driving, speed instability only 
decreased significantly in the ACC+AS condition (F(1,21) = 16.3, p < 0.005), although a 
marginal decrease was observed when using AS (F(1,21) = 3.88, p < 0.1).  The test 
between Manual and ACC conditions was nonsignificant (F(1,21) = 2.16, p = 0.156).  
Finally, the ANOVA for headway stability did not produce a significant main effect 
(F(3,63) = 1.78, p = 0.161). 
 
Secondary task data 
The dependent variable for secondary task data was number of correct responses.  
This was determined to be the most appropriate measure of spare capacity, as it reflected 
the level of concentration participants were investing in the secondary task.  Total 
number of responses may have been inflated if participants were randomly responding 
without thinking about their answers.  A visual inspection of the data, however, suggested 
that error rate was quite constant (around 5%), and a statistical examination revealed no 
difference between conditions (F(3,57) = 1.33, p = 0.273).  Therefore, in the end it would 
have made little difference to the analyses if the dependent variable was the number of 
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correct responses or total number of responses.  Proportion correct would not have 
revealed any effects as a dependent variable, due to the consistency in error rates. 
Number of correct responses was therefore entered into a repeated measures 
ANOVA, with level of automation as the within-subjects variable.  This time, repeated 
contrasts were used to determine the nature of any differences, with the conditions 
ordered from fully manual to fully automated control (ordering of partial automation 
conditions was based on rank).  Repeated contrasts were chosen for these MWL data 
because we were now concerned with any stepwise decreases in demand with increasing 
levels of automation.  Remember throughout these analyses that an increase in the 
number of correct responses implies more spare attentional capacity, or lower MWL. 
The number of correct responses on the secondary task demonstrated a significant 
main effect of level of automation (F(3,78) = 98.1, p < 0.001).  Repeated contrasts 
revealed that there was no difference between Manual and ACC conditions (F(1,26) = 
1.16, p = 0.291), but there were stepwise increases in responses from ACC to AS 
(F(1,26) = 49.8, p < 0.001), and from AS to ACC+AS conditions (F(1,26) = 51.4, p < 
0.001).  Mean numbers of responses in each condition were 108.5 (Manual; SE = 9.36), 
111.3 (ACC; SE = 9.25), 181.8 (AS; SE = 8.43), and 214.3 (ACC+AS; SE = 5.97).  
These data are represented graphically in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Secondary task scores in each condition.  Higher score implies more spare 
attentional capacity, and thus lower MWL 
 
 
Attention ratio data--the test for MART 
The attention ratio is derived from the secondary task score and the amount of 
visual attention directed at the secondary task.  The latter is gathered from the video data, 
which could not be analysed for all participants.  Therefore, the attention ratio analysis is 
performed on a subset of participants.  Before presenting that analysis, it is necessary to 
repeat the ANOVA for the secondary task data within this subset, to check that the 
secondary task patterns are consistent with the main group. 
ACC+ASASACCManual
M
e
a
n
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f c
o
rr
e
ct
 
re
sp
o
n
se
s
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
Young, M. S. & Stanton, N. A. (2002). Malleable Attentional Resources Theory: A new explanation for the effects 
of mental underload on performance.  Human Factors, 44(3), 365-375 
 
18 
Unsurprisingly, there was still a main effect of automation on secondary task 
performance (F(3,57) = 64.9, p < 0.001).  As before, there was no difference between the 
Manual and ACC conditions (F(1,19) = 0.245, p = 0.627), although responses did 
increase in the AS condition (F(1,19) = 26.7, p < 0.001), and further in the ACC+AS 
condition(F(1,19) = 45.7, p < 0.001).  Mean numbers of correct responses in each 
condition were 103.4 (Manual; SE = 11.9), 107.2 (ACC; SE = 11.4), 170.3 (AS; SE = 
10.7), and 207.7 (ACC+AS; SE = 6.81).  In sum, the pattern of secondary task responses 
within this subset directly reflected that of the main sample.  Therefore, the analysis of 
attention ratio may proceed with confidence. 
The attention ratio data were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA.  Here, as 
with the MWL data from the secondary task, repeated contrasts were used to determine if 
adjacent levels of automation were significantly different from one another. 
A significant main effect of automation was found (F(3,57) = 34.7, p < 0.001).  
Repeated contrasts revealed no difference between Manual and ACC conditions (F(1,19) 
= 1.02, p = 0.325), however a significant reduction in attention ratio was observed from 
ACC to AS (F(1,19) = 14.2, p < 0.005) and from AS to ACC+AS (F(1,19) = 37.9, p < 
0.001).  These effects are illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Attention ratio score in each condition.  Lower score implies smaller attentional 
resource capacity 
 
These are striking data, directly in line with the secondary task data themselves.  
It appears that, when MWL decreases, the allocation of attention to the secondary task 
becomes less efficient.  This could either represent shrinkage of attentional resources (as 
predicted by MART), or simply a change in strategy by the participants--perhaps 
reflecting a speed-accuracy trade-off.  However, since the analysis of secondary task 
error rates found that the percentage of correct responses remained stable in all four 
conditions, it is unlikely that such a strategy change was occurring.  Therefore, malleable 
attentional resources theory seems to be the most likely explanation for these data. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Implications: Mental workload and performance 
The present results indicate that automation does indeed have a significant effect 
on driver MWL, although the specifics of this effect depend on the level of automation.  
Nilsson (1995) found no significant differences in subjective MWL between manual and 
ACC-supported driving.  Yet in the study by Stanton et al. (1997), ACC reduced 
workload as evidenced by the secondary task results.  The present results favour 
Nilsson’s (1995) conclusions, as there was no effect of ACC on the secondary task. 
It is apparent that in this situation, AS has a far greater influence on workload 
than ACC.  Again, this finding contradicts Desmond et al. (1998), who found that even a 
combination of lateral and longitudinal automation did not affect subjective MWL.  
However, the present findings are in accordance with the reduced subjective demands of 
an automated highway system, reported by de Waard et al. (1999).  Furthermore, an 
analysis of vehicle dynamics demonstrates that steering is a second-order tracking task 
(i.e., control of acceleration; cf. Wickens, Gordon and Liu, 1998), whereas headway 
control is first-order (i.e., velocity control).  Since tracking difficulty increases with 
control order, it makes sense that AS should relieve MWL to a greater extent than ACC. 
In general, this experiment suggests that there are no adverse consequences of 
reductions in MWL for performance.  Whilst automated lateral control reduced MWL as 
measured by the secondary task, this did not have any effect on speed and headway 
maintenance (the remaining manual subtask in the AS condition).  In comparison with 
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previous studies, this does little to clear the water, as there have been contradictory 
results regarding the effects of automation on MWL and performance.  Both Desmond et 
al. (1998) and Nilsson (1995) found degraded performance with automation in the 
absence of reductions in MWL, whilst de Waard et al. (1999) and Stanton et al. (1997) 
found that automation affected MWL as well as performance.  However, each of these 
experiments employed critical driving scenarios (e.g., automation failure), and these may 
have influenced the subjective ratings used by Desmond et al. (1998) and Nilsson (1995).  
In the present study, normal driving performance was assessed, so the secondary task 
may have been more sensitive to MWL differences between the automation conditions.  
The fact that reduced MWL did not affect performance may have been due to the fact that 
normal driving (rather than responses to critical situations) was under scrutiny, and 
attentional resources were shrinking to match task demands, as MART predicts. 
 
Implications: Malleable attentional resources theory 
The attention ratio score is possibly the single most important result to emerge 
from this experiment, and it provides the first piece of evidence in favour of Malleable 
Attentional Resources Theory.  The fact that participants’ responses on the secondary 
task do not vary consistently with the amount of attention they are directing to the task 
suggests that the size of the resource pool can change.  On the basis of the malleable 
attentional resources hypothesis, it was expected that the attention ratio score would 
decrease in line with the MWL data from the secondary task.  This prediction was 
directly upheld by the observed data, providing strong evidence for an association 
between task demands and attentional resource capacity. 
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These are very encouraging results for MART.  Further support is provided by the 
primary task performance data, as these reductions in demand are not accompanied by 
changes in driving performance.  It could be argued that these results are due to different 
attention allocation strategies, or a qualitative change in the driving task (from active 
operator to passive monitor), allowing more time to be devoted to the secondary task in 
the light of a perceived reduction in driving demands.  If participants’ allocation policies 
were inappropriate to the relative task demands though, either a decrement in driving 
performance or an improvement in secondary task performance should be observed.  This 
was not the case--driving performance remained constant regardless of attention ratio 
score, and no improvement in secondary task error rate was observed.  Therefore, all 
attention devoted to the secondary task really did represent spare capacity.  Furthermore, 
the fact that driving performance did not improve with reductions in task demands 
implies that all spare capacity was allocated to the secondary task.  It is reasonably safe to 
assume, then, that the sum of primary and secondary task demands reflected the total 
attentional capacity of the driver.  Given this assumption, and the fact that increases in 
secondary task scores were not proportional to increases in visual attention, it is logical to 
conclude that attentional capacity had shrunk. 
An alternative perspective might appeal to the classic vigilance decrement (e.g., 
Mackworth, 1948; Singleton, 1989) as an explanation for the results obtained here.  
However, the present experimental design does not qualify it as a vigilance task.  
Observations elsewhere (Singleton, 1989; Warm, Dember and Hancock, 1996) typically 
find that a vigilance decrement sets in after 20-30 minutes.  Given the 10 minute trials in 
the current study, it is unlikely that vigilance would have caused a problem.  
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Furthermore, Parasuraman (1987) argued that continuous, dynamic tasks do not lend 
themselves to vigilance problems, and it is easily arguable that the task of driving fits 
these criteria.  Therefore, malleable attentional resources theory seems to be a more likely 
explanation for these data. 
Other alternatives relate to the nature of the task, and centre around issues of 
motivation and arousal.  One might suggest that participants were simply bored or less 
motivated to maintain performance on the secondary task in the underload conditions.  If 
this were the case, it would be expected that a lack of motivation would have a general 
effect on performance.  Since performance on the primary (driving) task was not affected, 
the balance of evidence favours MART.  Similarly, although physiological arousal was 
not measured in the present study, all of the experimental conditions posed fairly equal 
levels of physical demand.  There was no reason to believe a priori that physiological 
arousal would vary, and the counterbalanced conditions should have mitigated any 
confounding effects of motivation or arousal.  However, it is acknowledged that mental 
demands might only have influenced attentional capacity via an effect on arousal.  Future 
research could strengthen the argument for MART by including measures of motivation 
and arousal. 
From a theoretical point of view, the possible influence of arousal actually gives 
MART more support from the established literature.  Kahneman’s (1973) original model 
of attention explicitly identified physiological arousal as a factor in attentional capacity.  
If future investigations into MART cannot dissociate mental demands from arousal in 
determining resource size, then the contribution of this research will be limited to 
resurrecting ideas that have been glossed over in the applied literature since.  In these 
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authors’ opinion, such a contribution is no less valuable than validating the new theory 
itself.  Indeed, there are practical advantages in the link with arousal, since it is more 
readily detected than mental underload, and may help to design monitoring systems. 
In terms of the design implications, then, one might controversially conclude that 
drivers should be given extra tasks in their automated cars in order to maintain capacity at 
optimal levels.  Of course, this denies all best practice in human factors, which prescribes 
a holistic approach to designing systems around the driver.  Most ergonomists now agree 
that systems should be designed to support the driver, rather than replace them (Alm, 
Svidén and Waern, 1997; Grote, Weik, Wafler and Zolch, 1995; Stanton and Young, 
1998).  The technology behind ACC could feasibly be used to present distance and/or 
relative speed information to the driver, rather than actively controlling the vehicle itself.  
This solution would also satisfy the driver’s need for feedback, a classic problem with 
automated systems (Norman, 1990). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analyses presented here provide a detailed insight into the relationship 
between automation, MWL, and performance, and strong support for the proposed theory 
of malleable attentional resources was found.  The data on attentional gaze provided a 
very convincing indication that the size of attention resource pools can shrink directly in 
line with reductions in MWL.  If these results can be replicated, and the pattern of 
attentional capacity with MWL adequately mapped, then MART will really begin to have 
some predictive power.  However, it remains to be seen whether the ‘strong’ version of 
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MART, which favours the role of task demands over arousal or effort in determining 
attentional capacity, will be supported. 
It has been demonstrated thus far that the introduction of automation into the 
automobile can significantly reduce driver MWL, and that this has the potential of 
affecting the attentional capacity of drivers.  Previous research suggests that in 
automation failure situations, many drivers cannot reclaim control of the vehicle, and a 
collision is the inevitable result (Nilsson, 1995; Stanton et al., 1997).  Given the theories 
being developed in this paper, the reason for such performance decrements would be a 
reduced ability to devote appropriate levels of attention to the situation.  This potentially 
offers a definitive explanation of mental underload, as well as the opportunity to make 
practical predictions for performance with automation.  Further research in the SDS has 
made a structured investigation of responses to automation failure, and this will be 
reported in a later paper.  By linking together these strands of information, it is hoped that 
a body of evidence can be built to refine and uphold Malleable Attentional Resources 
Theory as proposed in this paper. 
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